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Internet Services: An Economic Model of Duopoly Competition Between Internet
Service Providers
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consumers are more sensitive to differences in price than
differences in connection quality:

Abstract
As consumer demand for Internet access and online
services continues to grow, so does the competition for
market share (i.e., subscriptions) among Internet Service
Providers (ISPs). According to recent surveys consumers
rate two criteria as most important when deciding to
subscribe, or continue a subscription, to an ISP:
•

•

the connection quality provided to consumers by the
network infrastructure. The connection quality refers
to factors such as the accessibility, speed, and
reliability of the Internet connection. Connection
quality depends on the investments made in the ISPs
network infrastructure (e.g., network bandwidth,
router switching capacity, and server performance)
and the number of subscribers served by that
infrastructure. Decisions about connection quality
affect the quality of services and, therefore, consumer
demand for these services.

•

How should an ISP price its services and respond to
changes in the investment and pricing decisions made
by competing firms?

•

How will falling technology prices (e.g., for network
bandwidth, server capacity and performance, and
other infrastructure technologies) affect the optimal
investment and pricing decisions by ISPs in this
market?

•

Falling technology prices should encourage ISPs to
invest more heavily in connection quality which will
result in better access and service quality for
consumers, but at higher prices.

1. Introduction
Recently, growth in consumer demand for Internet
access and services (e.g., email, personal web space,
newsgroups, message boards, and chat rooms) has been
explosive, a trend that is expected to continue over the
next decade. In March of 1999, Yankee Group, a market
research firm, estimated that about 25% of U.S.
households had access to the Internet. However, the firm
also predicted that the percent of U.S. households with
online access would grow to 33% by the end of 1999 and
to 66% by the end of 2003 (Fusco, 1999). In addition, it
was estimated that over the next five years the online
services market will grow at a compounded annual rate of
21% with households spending more than $56 billion on
Internet access and services during this period.

In this paper, we develop an economic model, based
on the well-established model of R&D competition used
by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1998) and Amir and
Wooders (1998), to examine the trade-offs between
decisions made about investments in connection quality
and decisions made about pricing the services that result
from these investments for firms competing in a duopoly
market for Internet access and services. More
specifically, we address the following research questions:
How should an ISP determine the optimal investment
in connection quality (or network infrastructure)?

Prices charged by ISPs should be positively
correlated with each other (independent of
differences in connection quality)

The results of the analyses will help decision-makers
in the Internet services market better understand the
implications of their investment and pricing decisions on
consumer demand for services and firm profits.

the price charged by the ISP for access to its Internet
services.

•

•

Presently, the market for online services is dominated
by America Online (AOL) which accounted for about
57% of the U.S. market as of March of 1999. Three other
providers, Microsoft Network (MSN), AT&T WorldNet,
and Earthlink (which recently merged with MindSpring)
compete for the second position in the U.S. Internet
access market, accounting for about 6%, 5%, and 4% of
the market respectively.
These Internet service providers (ISPs) are competing
aggressively for U.S. market share with a significant
focus on targeting and attracting new (or potential) users
of Internet services. According to Emily Meehan, analyst
in the Yankee Group’s Internet Market Strategies practice
area, “Any company serious about obtaining double-digit
market share must focus on the newbie market; the 75
percent of households who have yet to get online.” In

Two key findings in this analysis are that when
considering a market for Internet services in which
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fact, AOL Chief Executive Steve Case has said that even
AOL is attempting to increase its subscriber base by
focusing on the “95% of people out there who are not
subscribers." (Richards, 1999) Therefore, many ISPs are
attempting to develop services and pricing strategies that
will not only attract existing Internet users but also attract
new users.

Section 7 concludes the paper and identifies some areas of
future research.

2. Investing in Connection-Quality
ISPs may attract more customers by improving the
quality of network services provided to subscribers. The
connection-quality refers to factors such as the amount of
up-time and accessibility, speed of Internet access, the
reliability of connection, the amount of delays or packet
loss, and the amount of personal web space made
available to subscribers2. The connection-quality (and,
therefore, the quality of network services) depends on the
ISPs investments in network infrastructure – that is, the
bandwidth of the network media, the switching capacity
of routers, and the performance (e.g., disk and CPU
capacity) of servers used by the ISP3. Investments in
these network infrastructure components will generally
lead to higher user satisfaction. For example, users desire
broader network bandwidth (i.e., broadband network
technology currently enabled by digital subscriber lines
(DSL), cable-modems, and satellites) to meet their
growing needs, including support for more dynamic web
page usage, richer on-line multimedia experiences, and
faster file downloading and messaging.

However, for a potential customer of Internet services
comparing ISPs is often difficult given all of the different
services and pricing strategies available in the market.
Several studies have attempted to identify the set of
criteria that potential customers consider most important
when deciding whether to subscribe, continue a
subscription, or discontinue a subscription to an ISP. In
particular, PC Magazine surveyed thousands of its
subscribers to gauge customer satisfaction with their ISP
(Miller, 1999).
Respondents rated price (40%) as the most important
criteria in choosing an ISP. Speed of access(33%),
available local access numbers(29%) and
reputation(26%), measures related to connection quality,
followed price as important factors in choosing an ISP1.
These findings suggest that while respondents are willing
to pay for improvements in network availability and
performance.

These investments in network and server capacity are
usually considered fixed, long-term investments because
it is technically difficult and expensive to increase or
modify capacity in the short-term. Once a network
bandwidth type, such as a 56K telephone line based
service, has been adopted by an ISP significant
investments must be made to change to a higher
bandwidth type such as DSL, cable, or satellite. For

However, despite the importance of network criteria in
customers’ decision making, many ISPs rate poorly along
these criteria. In fact, “U.S. Internet users are fed up with
busy signals, leading to widespread dissatisfaction with
Internet service providers and higher rates of users who
switch ISPs” (Weil, 1998). Based on these observations,
ISPs attempting to grow market share and attract
subscribers should focus on developing strategies that
carefully consider the trade-offs between the quality of
network services provided to their subscribers and the
price charged for those services.

2
The Internet uses a technology called packet-switching.
The term packets (or frames, or cells) refers to the fact that data
stream from a computer is broken up into packets of about 200
bytes (on average), which are then sent out onto the network.
This technology is connectionless, meaning there is no end-toend setup for a session; each packet is independently routed to
its destination. With current technology, packets are generally
accepted onto the network on a first-come/first-served basis.
Routers are devices or softwares in a computer that determines
the next network point to which a packet should be forwarded
towards its destination. When traffic is heavy, the only way the
Internet can handle the congestion is either by delaying traffic or
by dropping (or discarding) packets so that some information
must be resent by the originating software (Mackie-Mason and
Varian, 1994; Nogueira and Cavalcanti, 1998).

In this paper we develop an economic model to
examine the trade-offs between investments in connection
quality and pricing of services for firms competing in a
duopoly market for Internet access and services. Section
2 and 3 further motivate the focus on firm decisions about
investments in connection quality and pricing of services.
Section 4 presents the key research questions to be
examined. Section 5 presents the model assumptions.
Section 6 presents the initial model results. Finally,

3
1

Telechoice and Inter@active had over 1000 businesses
complete an ISP Customer Satisfaction Survey in 1998.
Respondent rated connection availability, network
performance, and reputation for speed of diagnosis and repair
as the most important criteria in evaluating an ISP. Price closely
followed in importance with 80% of the respondents citing price
as important in choosing an ISP.

According to (Odlyzko, 1998):

“A study carried out in 1997 by Christian Huitema about
accessing some popular servers showed that 20% were not
reachable. Among the 80% that could be reached, 42% of the
delays were caused by network transmission, with DNS [domain
name server] accounting for 13% and servers for the remaining
45%.”
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network infrastructure will significantly affect the
pricing of Internet services.

example, Excite@home had to sign up with 23 cable TV
partners in 1999 in order to begin providing cable-based
services to its subscribers (Nee, 1999). In response to this
and similar investments in bandwidth made by
competitors, AOL announced in January 2000 a merger
with Time Warner, a media company that owns the U.S.’s
second largest cable systems; this merger would enable
AOL to offer similar cable-based services. Investments
such as these would generally be considered long-term
investments.

•

4. Research Questions
Therefore, as ISPs attempt to attract more subscribers,
they must decide how to most appropriately invest in
connection-quality and how to price the resulting Internet
services they are offering; as we will see later, these
decisions involve complex trade-offs. In this paper, we
will examine the optimal investment and pricing decisions
for firms competing in a duopoly market for Internet
services in which subscribers gain access to these services
through dial-up modem, DSL, or cable modem.

One factor affecting an ISP’s decision to invest in
network infrastructure is the cost associated with these
investments. The costs of broader network bandwidth,
disk and CPU capacity of servers, memory, web space,
and other infrastructure components have decreased
dramatically over recent years. For example, prices for
DSL service, a form of high-speed connection, are
declining due in part to competition from cable-modem
services. The aggressive launch of the cable-modem
service, which like DSL offers speeds up to 100 times
faster than conventional dialup service, has forced DSL
providers to lower prices.

More specifically, we develop an economic model to
address the following research questions derived from the
discussion above:

However, there is some debate regarding the impact of
the declining costs associated with these infrastructure
components on prices charged by ISPs. On one hand,
according to David Pine, vice president of cable-modem
provider Excite@Home, "With cable and phone
companies, not to mention wireless and satellite
providers, slugging it out with competing varieties of
broadband Internet service, consumers can bet on lower
prices, more features and more innovation." (Woo, 1999).
Alternatively, declining technology costs may encourage
ISPs to invest in more network infrastructure than they
would otherwise, leading to improvements in network
quality. This, in turn, may lead to an increase in prices as
profit-maximizing ISPs attempt to recover their
investment costs and to take advantage of the increased
demand for their “faster and more reliable” services.

1) How should an ISP determine the optimal investment
in network infrastructure?

•

This raises the question of whether or not an ISP
should invest in more bandwidth and better server
performance. That is, answering this question should
help identify whether or not AOL should invest in
relationships with Time Warner, Bell Atlantic Corp.,
and SBC Communications Inc. to provide DSL and
cable-modem services or just stay with its existing
infrastructure of dial-up telephone lines.

2) How should an ISP price its services and respond to
changes in the flat-rate prices charged by competing
ISPs?

•

3. Pricing Internet Access and Services
Flat-rate pricing refers to a pricing strategy adopted
by many ISPs in recent years in which firms charge
customers a fixed fee for unlimited – or limited – access
to Internet services. This has been a common pricing
strategy among ISPs in the U.S. market since 1996
(Swisher, 1999; Rafter, 1998). The fixed-rate charged by
an ISP depends on:

•

Demand for the ISP’s services – Customer demand
will also drive prices. As discussed earlier, demand
partially depends upon the connection-quality and
content provided by the ISP (and, of course, the
price) and consumers’ sensitivity to these factors.

In 1998, AOL raised its monthly subscription rate by
$2, from $19.95 to $21.95 (Quistgaard, 1998). At the
time, many observers expected competitors to
quickly follow suit, raising the price of Internet
access for everyone. However, after the rate hike,
most ISPs kept their pricing the same while some
even lowered their monthly rates to attract more
subscribers (Heid, 1998).
We will attempt to
examine such dynamic behaviors in our models.

3) How will falling technology prices (e.g., for network
bandwidth, server CPU capacity, memory, and other
infrastructure technologies) affect ISPs’ investment
and pricing strategies in this market?

Investments in network infrastructure – Most of the
costs of providing Internet services are the fixed costs
associated with the network infrastructure. The
incremental cost of sending additional packets (or
information) is essentially zero if the network is not
saturated. Therefore, the size of investment in

•
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As suggested earlier, while some believe that
declining technology costs should lead to lower
prices for Internet access, others believe that

declining costs will encourage much larger
investments in infrastructure (and, therefore, network
quality), leading to price increases to cover the costs
and accommodate for changes in demand.

•

While these questions are important to answer for
ISPs, research on optimal investment and pricing
decisions for ISPs has received little attention in the
information systems and economics literature. In this
paper we present an economic model to analyze the
relationship between investments in connection-quality
and pricing of Internet services.

The competition between ISPs is analyzed by solving
subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game. After
proving the existence of equilibria, we will use static
analysis to analyze the impact of the model parameters on
the equilibrium investment and pricing decision made by
each firm.
In this two-stage model, Firm 1 faces a demand
function for its Internet services, Q1, which depends on
the following:

Model Assumptions
We consider a two-stage model of duopoly
competition in a market in which each firm provides
consumers with unlimited Internet access and unlimited
usage of services at a flat-rate price. We assume that
subscribers access these services through dial-up modem,
DSL, or cable modem4. In the first stage, the firms
simultaneously invest in the network infrastructure (e.g.,
network bandwidth and server capacity) that enables and
supports their service offerings. This investment
essentially differentiates the connection-quality offered by
each firm. In the second stage, each ISP observes the
connection quality of its competitor. Then, based on
these observations and the demand functions facing each
firm, both firms simultaneously determine a flat-rate price
to charge for access to their Internet services5. The
services offered by each firm are somewhat differentiated
(e.g., personalized content, personalized interface, special
chat rooms, etc.), but can be substituted to some extent.

•

Its own price (p1) and the competing firm’s price (p2)
– the demand function implies that a decrease in p1 or
an increase in p2 will increase consumer demand for
Firm 1’s services.

•

Its investment (k1) in connection-quality and the
competing firm’s investment (k2) in connectionquality – the demand function implies that an
increase in k1 or a decrease in k2 will increase
consumer demand for Firm 1’s services

The demand function is symmetric for each firm and
is assumed to be linear in price and connection quality.
The demand function for Firm 1 is:

Q i = a − p i + bp j + k i − ck

j

It is assumed that Internet services (e.g., email,
newsgroups, chat rooms, and instant messaging) offered
by each firm in the second stage are not perfect
substitutes; that is, they are differentiated services to some
extent. For example, ISPs may provide access to
personalized content. The parameter values b (price
sensitivity) and c (connection-quality sensitivity) attempt
to capture this dimension. In addition, a represents the
size of the market. These parameter values are assumed
to be fixed, symmetric across firms, and exogenously
given.

To analyze this two-stage game of duopoly we will
adopt the well-established R&D competition model used
by D’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Amir and
Wooders (1998). We assume complete and perfect
information in this model; that is, we assume that the
payoff function for each firm is common knowledge and
that firms can observe their past decisions and those of the
competing firm. These assumptions are reasonable since:

•

ISPs’ investment decisions are generally made public
to attract investors in the stock market. In addition,
market intermediaries typically provide past
investment information at a low cost.

The technology investment options available for
providing Internet access are standardized and the
costs of technical support and software development
are common knowledge. This implies that firms can
estimate each other’s profit functions.

The cost function facing Firm 1 exhibits decreasing
returns to scale in k1 (note that the cost function is
symmetric for Firm 2). α is a technology cost coefficient
characterizing trends in the costs of infrastructure
technologies. As the costs to purchase and install broader
network bandwidth and better server capacity fall over
time, α becomes smaller; if α approaches zero network
infrastructure would be free to purchase and install. v is
the variable costs per subscription associated with serving
additional customers; more subscribers require more
technical support which, in turn, requires more technical
support assistants and phone numbers. In this model, we
will interpret v as the industry standard support level per

4
The assumption of duopoly competition seems reasonable
since a small number of firms serve a large percent of the
consumers of Internet access and services.
5

As suggested earlier, ISPs typically invest in network
infrastructure (which is usually considered a fixed cost because
it is technically difficult and expensive to modify) and then price
services based on these investments (and consumer demand)
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subscription and we will take it as fixed, symmetric across
firms, and exogenously given.

straightforward analytically that that of the connectionquality sensitive market6.

The total cost function is symmetric for each firm.
The total cost function for Firm 1 is:

5. Model Results

C

i

= α

k

Based on these assumptions, we will now present the
subgame perfect equilibrium in the two-stage model of
duopoly competition7. In the first stage, the firms
simultaneously determine levels of connection-quality
through investments in network infrastructure. In the
second stage, each firm observes each other’s connection
quality; they then simultaneously set flat-rate prices for
unlimited access to their Internet services. We will begin
our analysis in the second stage and identify the
equilibrium price set by each firm.

2
i

2

+ v iQ

i

Finally, the profit function is symmetric for each firm.
The profit function for Firm 1 is:
Π i = ( p i − v i )( a − p i + bp j + k i − ck j ) − α

2

ki
2

Parameter Assumptions: (i) a > v, (ii) 0 < b, c < 1, and
(iii) α > 8/9

Optimal Pricing Decisions (Stage 2)

The assumption that a > v is trivial but required to
ensure that optimal investments in connection quality are
non-negative. The assumption that 0 < b, c < 1 allows us
to focus on a market in which a firm’s own investment
and pricing decisions have a greater impact on consumer
demand for its services than do the decisions made by its
competitor. The final assumption, α > 8/9, ensures that
the costs of technology are sufficiently large to make the
firm’s profit function exhibit decreasing returns to scale.

The optimal pricing decisions, p1* and p2*, in stage 2
given the investment decisions, k1 and k2, made in stage 1
are:
( b + 2 )( a + v ) + ( b − 2 c ) k 2 + ( 2 − bc ) k 1
4 − b2
( b + 2 )( a + v ) + ( b − 2 c ) k 1 + ( 2 − bc ) k 2
*
p 2 (k1 , k 2 ) =
4 − b2

p1 ( k 1 , k 2 ) =
*

In addition, when examining this model we will
assume that consumer demand for Internet access and
services is more sensitive to changes in price than to
changes in connection-quality. We will term this market
a price-sensitive market.

These equations show that in a price-sensitive market
Firm 1’s Nash equilibrium price, p1*, increases not only
with k1 but also with k2; that is, the coefficients for these
two variables, (b – 2c) and (2 – bc) respectively, are both
positive given Assumption (ii) and the definition of a
price sensitive market presented in Section 5. More
specifically, these equilibrium price equations imply that
if Firm 2 makes an incremental investment in connectionquality (i.e., increases k2) it will also increase p2 to
compensate for its incremental investment and to respond
to changes in consumer demand for its improved services.
However, Firm 1’s profit-maximizing response would be
to increase its own price, p1 (without making an
incremental investment of its own). However, the
increase in p1 should be less than the increase in p2. This
is because from the equations we see that:

Definition: A market is defined as a price-sensitive
market if b > 2c
We assume a price-sensitive market because, even
though network criteria are important, changes in
connection-quality are not as salient to consumers of
Internet services than are changes in price. That is,
consumers are typically are not fully informed about the
connection qualities of each ISP. In addition, most
consumers must incur some search costs to find this
information either from magazines, consumer reports, or
friends and family. Without precise information about
connection qualities, many dial-up ISPs appear to provide
similar content and features (and typically a standard 56K
dial-up connection). However, price differences are
easier to identify. Therefore, consumers are likely to be
more sensitive to changes in price than to changes in
connection-quality (but consumer demand is still sensitive
to both in absolute terms). This may be especially true for
first-time subscribers to Internet services, an important
target of many ISPs. In addition to issues of saliency, the
analysis of the price-sensitive market is more

∆p2 = (2 – bc)*∆k2

and

∆p1 = (b – 2c)*∆k2

6

When considering a price-sensitive market, each subgame
at the second stage of the two-stage model shows a unique,
interior, Nash equilibrium. However, when considering a
connection-quality sensitive market both interior and boundary
Nash equilibria exist. While we have performed the analysis for
the connection-quality sensitive market, we are unable to present
the results here due to the complexity of the analytics and the
space limitations.
7
Due to space limitations we are unable to present the
derivations of these results. However, they can be obtained by
contacting the authors.
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Given Assumption (ii) we know that (2 – bc) > (b –
2c) which implies that Firm 1 will respond to an increase
in k2 by increasing its price, p1 (despite making no
changes to its own connection quality, k1), but by an
amount less than Firm 2 increases its price. The intuition
is that in a price sensitive market Firm 1 has an
opportunity to increase its margins (by increasing p1)
while still attracting switchers from Firm 2 (by not
increasing p1 by too much). Again, this result relies on
the assumption that these firms compete in a market in
which consumer demand is more sensitive to differences
in price that to differences in connection quality.

equations and shown in Figure 1); in fact, firms increase
their investments, k1 and k2, so much that their total
investment costs increase despite the reduction in α. In
turn, this will imply an increase in prices charged (see
Figure 2), and an increase in profit earned, for both firms
in stage 2. The intuition is as follows: as α decreases, an
increase in connection quality will now have a smaller
affect on pricing decisions made in stage 2 (although the
effect is still positive). This will encourage firms to
increase their investment in connection quality to increase
their profits in stage 2. This result suggests that as
investments costs, such as those associated with changing
a 56K modem connection to a cable-modem connection,
decline that this market will result in better connection
quality for consumers, but at higher prices.

These pricing equations also imply that an increase in
v, the industry standard variable costs per subscription,
will lead to an in increase in the equilibrium prices
charged by both firms, given the investment decisions, k1
and k2, made in stage 1. This result is intuitive as the
firms would need to increase their flat-rate prices to
compensate for (or cover) the higher variable costs
associated with providing service and support to
consumers.

Figure 1. Impact of decreasing technology cost on
connection quality

c onnec tion
quality

Optimal Investment Decisions (Stage 1)
The optimal investment decisions, k1* and k2*, in stage
1 are:

k1 = k 2 =
*

*

2 ( 2 − bc )( a − v (1 − b ))
α ( b + 2 )( 2 − b ) 2 − 2 (1 − c )( 2 − bc )

tec hnology c os t c oeffic ient

That is, in equilibrium both firms will invest equally
in connection-quality in stage 1. Of course, this also
implies that both firms will charge the same equilibrium
price in Stage 2.

Figure 2. Impact of decreasing technology cost on
price

These equations also imply that an increase in v will
lead to a decrease in the optimal investments decisions,
k1* and k2*, made in Stage 1. This reduction is designed
to partially offset the positive correlation between v and
equilibrium prices in Stage 2. By making a smaller
investment in stage 1, the firms will “cushion” the impact
of v on price in stage 2; this result is critical for firms
competing in a price sensitive market where consumer
demand is more sensitive to changes in price than to
changes in connection quality.

pric e

tec hnology c os t c oeffic ient

The Impact of α, the Technology Cost
Coefficient, on Equilibrium Decisions

7. Future Research
In this paper we examined a two-stage model of
duopoly competition in a market in which each firm
provides consumers with unlimited Internet access and
unlimited usage of services at a flat-rate price. Two key
findings in this analysis are that when considering a
market for Internet services in which consumers are more

A decrease in α implies that advances in technology
have led to a reduction in computing prices and, therefore,
a reduction in the costs of purchasing and installing
network infrastructure. According to the equations for k1
and k2 such a decrease would encourage firms to increase
their investments in connection quality in stage 1 (as
implied by the positive α in the denominator of these
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D’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A., “Cooperative and
Noncooperative R&D in Duopoly with Spillovers,” The
American Economic Review, December 1988, pp.11331137.

sensitive to differences in price than differences in
connection quality:
•

Prices charged by ISPs should be positively
correlated with each other

•

Falling technology prices should encourage ISPs to
invest more heavily in connection quality which will
result in better access and service quality for
consumers, but at higher prices.

Dewan, R., Freimer, M. and Seidman, A., “Portal
Kombat: The Battle between Web Pages to become the
Point of Entry to the World Wide Web,” HICSS 1998.
Fusco, P., “Research Firm Predicts Growth for ISPs”,
InternetNews.com –ISO News, March 23, 1999.

The results of the analyses will help decision-makers
in the Internet services market better understand the
implications of their investment and pricing decisions on
consumer demand for services and firm profits.

Heid, J., “AOL Rate Hike Ignites Internet Service Price
War”, PC World Magazine, May 1998.
Miller, M.J., “Why Users are Satisfied (or Not) with Their
ISPs,” Special Report, July 17, ZDNET.

In future research we plan several model extensions to
better account for complexities (e.g., alternative pricing
strategies) in the market for Internet services. In
addition, we will develop models to address the following
research questions:

Nee, E., “Is Excite@Home the AOL of broadband,”
Fortune 156 - 164 140, no. 11, December 6, 1999.
Nogueira, J. and Cavalcanti, J., “Pricing Network
Services: The Case of the Internet”, First Monday (2:5).

1) How will the results presented in this paper change if
the market is assumed to be a connection-quality
sensitive market (i.e., b < 2c) as opposed to a price
sensitive market (i.e., b > 2c)?

•

Odlyzko, A. “The Internet and Other Networks:
Utilization Rates and Their Implications,” Working Paper,
September 1998.
Parthasarathy, M. and Bhattacherjee, A. “Understanding
Post-adoption Behavior in the Context of Online
Services,” Information Systems Research, December
1998.

Changing this assumption will lead to a very different
set of results than presented in this paper and,
therefore, a very different set of prescribed strategies
for profit-maximizing ISPs. We will examine these
critical differences in detail in future research.

Quistgaard, K., “AOL Stock Soars on Price Hike,” Wired
News, February 9, 1998.

2) Under what conditions will an ISP decide to offer
free Internet access and services to the market?

•

Rafter, M., “Should ISPs Abandon Flat-Rate Pricing?,”
The Standard Intelligence for the Internet Economy,
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,6390,0
0.html.

Since 1998, the market for Internet access and
services has seen the emergence and growth of free
ISPs – that is, firms that offer customers access to
Internet services for free (e.g., NetZero,
Blulight.com, iFreedom.com, and WorldSpy). Most
of these firms earn profits through advertising
subsidies – that is, by charging sponsors fees for
online advertising space (e.g., advertising banners or
windows). We will address the emergence of free
ISPs in more detail in future research. More
specifically, we will examine the conditions under
which offering free Internet access and services will
be an equilibrium strategy. More specifically, we
will attempt to characterize the advertising subsidy
that must be provided to sustain this strategy in
equilibrium.

Richards, R., “AOL Growth Slows; Stock Takes Another
Hit,” USA Today – Tech Report, February 28, 1999.
Swisher, K., aol.com, Times Business, 1999.
Weil, N., “Phony e-mail heats up Microsoft, AOL battle,”
Infoworld 21, no 35, August 30, 1999.
Weil, N., “ISP Study Ranks Top Ten Providers”, IDG
News Service, February 19, 1998.
Woo, K., “DSL Price Drop Due”, Newsbytes, October 29,
1999.
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